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Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment, and 
Federalism 
David Orentlicher 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the government has tried to promote the public’s 
health by regulating the flow of information from physicians, drug 
companies, and other persons or businesses to consumers and 
patients.
1
 The federal government requires the familiar nutrition 
labels on baked items, canned goods, and other processed foods;
2
 it 
also requires cigarette manufacturers to apprise potential purchasers 
about the risks from smoking.
3
 And states generally require 
physicians to discuss risks, benefits, and other information about a 
patient’s therapeutic options as part of the informed consent process.4 
In addition to mandating certain disclosures of information to 
promote health, the government prohibits other disclosures of 
information that it deems harmful to health. For example, the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) restricts the freedom of 
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 1. The government also tries to promote the public’s health by disseminating information 
directly to individuals, as with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s food pyramid in the past 
and food plate now. See generally Donald K. Layman, Eating Patterns, Diet Quality and 
Energy Balance: A Perspective About Applications and Future Directions for the Food 
Industry, 134 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 126, 127–28 (2014). 
 2.  21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012). More recently, the federal government has mandated 
calorie disclosures on restaurant menus. David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and Efforts to 
Encourage Healthy Choices by Individuals, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1637, 1642–48 (2014) (discussing 
21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2012)). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
 4. Many states also mandate specific disclosures by physicians as part of the informed 
consent process. This is common when informed consent is obtained from patients before an 
abortion or treatment for breast cancer. David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician 
Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9, 10–11 (2015).  
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pharmaceutical companies to advertise “off-label” uses of their 
drugs.
5
 The FDA also limits the ability of food manufacturers to 
promote the ways in which their products might improve health or 
treat disease.
6
 
But what may be good for health may not be constitutional. The 
First Amendment rightly recognizes that people generally must be 
able to speak freely without the government telling them what to say 
or what not to say. A robust free market of speech provides a critical 
safeguard for individual liberty. In short, government regulation of 
health-related information can bring two fundamental interests into 
conflict—the public interest in good health and the public interest in 
free speech. How, then, should the courts draw a balance between 
these two critical interests? 
In this Article, I consider the FDA’s restrictions on off-label 
promotional speech by pharmaceutical companies. As mentioned,
7
 
the FDA limits the freedom of companies to market their drugs for 
off-label uses—even though physicians are free to prescribe the drugs 
for those uses. By conditioning the freedom to advertise on whether a 
promoted use has been approved for inclusion on the drug’s label, the 
FDA gives pharmaceutical companies a strong incentive to 
 
 5. Off-label use refers to the fact that when the FDA approves a drug, it approves the 
drug for a specific use (or uses). Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent 
Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review 
Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 4 (2007). For example, when the FDA 
first approved Botox (now widely used with FDA approval for cosmetic purposes), the agency 
approved the drug for the treatment of two eye problems, strabismus and blepharospasm. 
Coleen Klasmeier & Martin Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First 
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 
329 (2011). Once a drug is approved, the package insert for the drug describes the approved use 
or uses (the “on-label” uses). On-label uses include not only the diseases which the drug can 
treat, but also whether the drug is approved for use in children as well as adults, and the dose at 
which the drug should be prescribed. Hall & Sobotka, supra, at 5. Once a drug is prescribed for 
approved uses, physicians may recognize other valuable uses for the drug. Hence, physicians 
are free to prescribe drugs for any medically justified purpose even if the use has not been 
approved by the FDA (off-label uses). John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A 
Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 303 & n.5 (2010). While physicians are free to prescribe the 
drug for off-label uses, pharmaceutical companies are not free to promote the off-label uses. 
 6. Hilary G. Buttrick & Courtney Droms Hatch, Pomegranate Juice Can Do That? 
Navigating the Jurisdictional Landscape of Food Health Claim Regulation in a Post-POM 
Wonderful World, 49 IND. L. REV. 267 (2016). 
 7. See supra text pp.89–90. 
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demonstrate that their drugs are indeed safe and effective for new 
uses.
8
 At the same time, physicians need not wait for approval before 
prescribing the drug for new uses if preliminary medical evidence 
suggests that the drug is safe and effective for those uses. By treating 
drug company promotion differently from physician prescribing, the 
FDA tries to draw an appropriate balance between access to effective 
uses of drugs and protection from unsafe uses of drugs. 
And we know from experience that patients gain important 
benefits from some off-label uses while realizing no benefit or even 
harm from other off-label uses. For example, among important 
treatments for cancer, off-label uses of drugs are common.
9
 In these 
cases, off-label prescribing provides significant benefits. In other 
cases, off-label uses are harmful. For example, when physicians 
routinely prescribed hormone replacement therapy off label to post-
menopausal women in the 1980s, the women were exposed to an 
increased risk of breast cancer, heart attack, and stroke.
10
 Overall, the 
likelihood of adverse side effects is greater with off-label uses of 
drugs than with their on-label uses.
11
 By restricting the promotion of 
off-label uses, the FDA can limit the extent to which drugs are 
prescribed for off-label uses until data on safety and effectiveness 
provide a clearer picture of a drug’s value for a new use. 
In recent years, especially in the wake of the decision by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Caronia,
12
 the FDA’s authority to regulate off-label promotional 
speech has been called into question. According to the Caronia court, 
the FDA’s rules run afoul of the First Amendment’s freedom of 
speech. In the court’s view, the FDA’s regulations create a conflict 
between government power and the safeguards provided by the First 
Amendment against an overreaching state, and the government’s 
desire to regulate must yield to the Constitution’s interest in personal 
 
 8. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health 
Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 239 (2011). 
 9. Hall & Sobotka, supra note 5, at 7; Kesselheim, supra note 8, at 235. 
 10. Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug 
Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 561 (2014). 
 11. Tewodros Eguale et al., Association of Off-Label Drug Use and Adverse Drug Events 
in an Adult Population, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 55 (2016) 
 12. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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liberty. If the FDA wants to limit off-label uses of drugs, it can 
regulate those uses directly rather than regulating them indirectly 
through the suppression of promotional speech.
13
  
However, direct regulation of off-label use raises its own 
constitutional concerns. Limits on off-label prescribing also implicate 
a fundamental constitutional principle that is designed to safeguard 
individual liberty—the principle of federalism. Restricting off-label 
use rather than off-label promotion may allow the FDA to avoid First 
Amendment problems, but it forces the FDA to intrude into matters 
traditionally regulated by state governments—it is state legislatures 
and licensing boards, rather than the federal government, that oversee 
doctors as they practice their craft, including decisions about 
treatment options for their patients.
14
 In other words, when it comes 
to the regulation of off-label uses of drugs, federalism is just as much 
at stake as is freedom of speech. Because of the FDA’s desire to 
respect state government authority, together with other considerations 
discussed in this essay, courts should reject the analysis of the 
Caronia court and give the FDA significant leeway in its regulation 
of off-label marketing. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Although the federal government allows physicians to exercise 
their medical judgment in deciding whether to prescribe a drug for a 
particular purpose, it does not allow pharmaceutical companies the 
same freedom to decide whether to promote a drug for a particular 
purpose. In its regulation of pharmaceutical company marketing 
activities, the FDA distinguishes between the promotion of on-label 
uses and the promotion of off-label uses. 
 
 13. Id. at 168.  
 14. Of course, regulation of medical practice is much more nuanced. The federal 
government often influences the practice of medicine through the conditions it attaches to 
reimbursement for care under Medicare or Medicaid (notwithstanding the Medicare statute 
itself which states that it shall not “be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to 
exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which 
medical services are provided,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012)). But federal authority is stronger 
when Congress exercises its spending power than when it exercises its commerce clause power, 
the main authority for federal regulation.  
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Under federal law, it is a crime to introduce a prescription drug 
into interstate commerce if the drug is “misbranded.”15 A drug can be 
misbranded in a number of ways. For purposes of off-label 
marketing, a drug is misbranded if its labeling does not include 
adequate directions for its intended uses,
16
 which is necessarily the 
case for off-label uses, since there are no directions on the label for 
those uses. 
Of course, when a pharmaceutical company sells its drugs, it can 
intend that they be used for on-label uses, so how does the 
government demonstrate that off-label uses were intended and that 
the drugs are misbranded? The FDA can cite to pharmaceutical 
marketing materials or other promotional speech as evidence of the 
company’s intent. If a company promotes off-label uses, then that is 
strong evidence that the company intends those uses.
17
 In the 
government’s view, companies are not prosecuted merely for 
promoting their drugs—a criminalization of speech—but for selling 
misbranded drugs—a criminalization of conduct. And of course, the 
government often uses a defendant’s speech as evidence of the 
defendant’s intent to commit a crime, as in conspiracy or fraud 
cases.
18
 
In the Caronia case, the court addressed the FDA’s misbranding 
theory in a muddled way, leaving some uncertainty about the 
application of its decision in other cases. Initially, the court 
concluded that Alfred Caronia was not in fact convicted because of 
misbranding; rather, he was convicted because of his speech (i.e., his 
discussions with physicians about off-label uses of his company’s 
drugs). According to the court, the FDA presented a case against Mr. 
Caronia for his words rather than for his company’s misbranding. 
Under this view of Caronia, the FDA can still prosecute 
pharmaceutical company executives when they promote off-label 
uses, as long as the agency is careful about the way it formulates its 
case. And it is not surprising that the Second Circuit was skeptical 
 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2012). 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2012). 
 17. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160–61. 
 18. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 80–81, 132–33 
(1992). 
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about the FDA’s case against Mr. Caronia. He was not a senior 
executive who oversaw company sales. Rather, he was a sales 
representative who discussed off-label uses with physicians who 
might prescribe his company’s drugs.19 Mr. Caronia was not 
introducing the drugs into interstate commerce; his superiors were 
doing so. 
But the Second Circuit’s opinion also discussed the First 
Amendment problems with FDA’s off-label marketing regulations in 
a broader context and indicated that they would not pass muster even 
if prosecutions were properly characterized as misbranding cases and 
brought against senior company executives.
20
 And that reading of 
Caronia was adopted by a federal district court in the Amarin 
Pharma v. FDA case that was decided in August 2015.
21
  
In Amarin, a pharmaceutical company wanted to promote off-
label uses for one of its drugs, but it did not want to risk misbranding 
charges. Because its promotional speech was being chilled, the 
company asked the court to invalidate the off-label speech 
regulations. The Amarin court observed that under Caronia, 
prosecutions for off-label marketing entail prosecutions on the basis 
of speech and therefore have to meet the Supreme Court’s heightened 
standard of review for restrictions on “commercial” speech. In 
applying the Caronia court’s understanding of the heightened 
standard, the Amarin court concluded that the restrictions on off-label 
promotion were unconstitutional. But the Amarin opinion is 
incoherent. It essentially says that the government must prosecute for 
conduct not just for speech, and of course there is conduct involved 
in misbranding cases—the selling of drugs in interstate commerce.22  
 
 19. To be sure, Mr. Caronia was charged with participating in a broad scheme to introduce 
misbranded drugs into interstate commerce. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 157–58. Nevertheless, his 
particular offense lay in his promotional speech. Id. at 159.  
 20. Id. at 164–69. 
 21. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 224–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 22. Id. at 228. 
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II. JUSTIFYING RESTRICTIONS ON OFF-LABEL MARKETING 
One can mount three lines of defense against the First 
Amendment attack on the FDA’s off-label marketing regulations. 
A. Off-Label Marketing Restrictions Do Not Implicate the First 
Amendment 
As the FDA observes, one can argue that there is no serious First 
Amendment issue. Companies are being charged with the sale of 
misbranded drugs, and the promotional advertising is relevant 
because it demonstrates a company’s intent to introduce its drugs into 
interstate commerce for off-label uses.
23
 It is common in criminal law 
to cite a defendant’s speech as evidence of intent, and in such cases, 
consideration of the defendant’s speech does not trigger the 
protection of the First Amendment.
24
  
Of course, there are serious First Amendment concerns when the 
government discriminates among speakers, and from one perspective 
that is what is happening with off-label marketing restrictions. 
Physicians are free to prescribe off label, and physicians, 
pharmacists, and anyone else can tout the off-label uses of a drug. 
Only the drug company’s employees or contractors cannot promote 
off-label uses.
25
 But the companies are not subject to prosecution 
simply for discussing off-label uses of their drugs; rather they are 
subject to prosecution for selling their drugs for off-label uses. 
Consider the following example. Suppose a state permits 
marijuana use for medical purposes but not for recreational purposes. 
The government suspects that a grower is supplying marijuana to 
rogue marijuana dispensaries so those clinics can unlawfully sell 
marijuana for recreational purposes. Hence, an undercover 
government agent poses as the owner of a marijuana dispensary to 
check out the grower. If the grower discusses the opportunities for 
distribution of marijuana for recreational purposes during 
 
 23. Brief and Special Appendix for the United States at 51–54, Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 09-5006-cr(L), 10-0750 (CON)), 2010 WL 6351497. 
 24. Robertson, supra note 10, at 549–50 (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 
(1993) and other authorities). 
 25. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165. 
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conversations with the agent and encourages dispensing marijuana 
for recreational purposes, that could be used as evidence that the 
grower was conspiring to divert marijuana for illicit purposes. 
Of course, recreational use of marijuana is unlawful in this 
hypothetical state while off-label use of prescription drugs is not 
unlawful in the United States. Perhaps that explains the difference 
between this hypothetical and the results in Caronia and Amarin. So 
suppose the state changes its ban on recreational marijuana to 
prohibit the sale of marijuana for recreational purposes but not the 
use of marijuana for recreational purposes. Rather than clogging its 
courts and prisons with users, the state wants to reserve its law 
enforcement resources for dealers. Under Caronia and Amarin, the 
marijuana grower could now invoke the First Amendment in a 
defense to the conspiracy charges. However, the applicability of the 
First Amendment to charges of illegal distribution should not hinge 
on whether use of a drug is illegal or not. 
Scholars have presented other reasons to conclude that off-label 
marketing restrictions do not implicate the First Amendment. 
Christopher Robertson, for example, has argued that the FDA often 
should prevail in its regulation of off-label marketing at the first 
prong of the four-part Central Hudson test for commercial speech 
regulations. Under the first prong of Central Hudson, commercial 
speech does not receive protection under the First Amendment if the 
speech is false or misleading.
26
 If promotional speech misleads 
physicians about the safety and effectiveness of a drug, patient 
welfare may be compromised. Accordingly, academic and judicial 
critics of the FDA’s restrictions on off-label marketing routinely 
observe that the FDA is regulating speech that is truthful and not 
misleading.
27
 But as Robertson points out, until a drug company or 
 
 26. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165–66 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The speech also must be about lawful activity. If a 
company’s commercial speech is not false or misleading, then the government can restrict it 
only if (a) the restrictions promote a substantial governmental interest, (b) the restrictions 
directly advance the governmental interest, and (c) the impact on the freedom of speech is not 
more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164 
(citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 27. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160; Robertson, supra note 10, at 556–57. That is not the 
case with all prosecutions for off-label marketing. In a number of off-label cases, the 
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someone else conducts the studies necessary to prove the accuracy of 
the company’s claims, courts are not in a position to deem 
promotional speech truthful and not misleading.
28
 Rather than 
presuming the truth of the marketing claims, courts should expect 
drug companies to demonstrate the truth of their claims by obtaining 
approval for the new use from the FDA or by proving their claims 
before the court.
29
  
B. The Public Interest in Health Outweighs any First Amendment 
Concerns with Off-Label Marketing Regulations  
Even if there is a serious First Amendment issue, the FDA can 
invoke important interests to justify its regulation of off-label 
promotional speech. That is, the FDA can defend its regulations on 
the ground that the public interest in good health is strong enough to 
overcome the individual interest in freedom of speech. In this view, 
the FDA regulations satisfy the heightened scrutiny that courts apply 
to restrictions on commercial speech under Central Hudson.
30
 
For example, under the final prong of the four-part test, courts 
consider whether there are alternate regulations that would serve the 
government’s interests while having less of an impact on freedom of 
speech. Applying this standard, the district court in Caronia observed 
that it was unable to identify any alternate regulations that would 
sufficiently further the government’s interest in having drug 
companies seek approval for new uses of their drugs.
31
 
 
promotional speech was misleading. Lars Noah, Permission to Speak Freely?, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 248, 248–49 (2014). 
 28. Robertson, supra note 10, at 558–60. See also Stephanie M. Greene, FDA 
Prohibitions on Off-Label Marketing Do Not Violate Drug Manufacturers’ First Amendment 
Rights, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 240, 242 (2014) (observing that the First Amendment 
defense to misbranding charges rests on “manufacturers’ unsubstantiated claims that the 
information they provide is in fact truthful and not misleading”). 
 29. Robertson, supra note 10, at 574. Of course, some promotional activities do not raise 
concerns about truthfulness, as when companies simply share copies of important peer-
reviewed articles that report the results of a study of the drug’s safety and effectiveness for an 
off-label use. The FDA permits drug companies to disseminate such articles without running 
afoul of the misbranding regulations. Revised Draft Guidance for Industry on Distributing 
Scientific and Medical Publications on Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices, 79 
Fed. Reg. 11,793, 11,794–95 (Mar. 3, 2014). 
 30. For a description of the Central Hudson standard, see supra note 26. 
 31. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). There is 
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C. Regulation of Drug Company Marketing Avoids Federalism 
Concerns 
While defenses of FDA’s regulations typically rest on the 
regulations’ role in protecting the public’s health, the regulations also 
can be justified on account of their role in ensuring proper respect for 
the principle of federalism and therefore in promoting proper respect 
for individual liberty. 
According to the First Amendment critique of the FDA’s off-label 
promotion regulations, if the FDA is concerned about off-label use of 
a prescription drug, the agency should regulate off-label use itself, 
thereby limiting off-label prescribing without infringing on freedom 
of speech.
32
 In Caronia, for example, the court observed that the 
government could impose “ceilings or caps on off-label 
prescriptions” or even, when off-label use is “exceptionally 
concerning, . . . prohibit the off-label use altogether.”33 The Supreme 
Court made a similar argument in the Western States case,
34
 when it 
struck down restrictions on the advertising of drug “compounding” 
by pharmacists.
35
 The Western States Court wrote that FDA could 
police inappropriate drug compounding by distinguishing between 
small-scale compounding for individual patients and large-scale 
 
disagreement on this point. Even without incentives from the FDA, the reimbursement policies 
of insurers provide an incentive for pharmaceutical companies to seek approval for new uses 
since insurers often restrict reimbursement for off-label uses, Noah, supra note 27, at 249. Or 
the FDA might give companies other incentives to seek approval for new uses, including 
extended patent exclusivity, Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. 
Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 75 (2011). 
 32. That is, according to the First Amendment critique, off-label marketing restrictions 
fail the final prong of the Central Hudson test. See supra note 26. 
 33. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012). At times, the FDA does 
police off-label use of drugs, as in cases in which there are serious side effects from the uses. 
Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 5, at 336–37. But exceptional interventions do not require the 
same degree of federal oversight as would routine regulation of off-label uses. 
 34. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002). 
 35. Id. at 360. For most patients, pharmacists dispense pills that have been manufactured 
by a pharmaceutical company. But for some patients, the pharmacist actually creates a 
medication that is tailored to the needs of that patient. Id. at 360–61. As the Western States 
Court wrote, “[c]ompounding is typically used to prepare medications that are not commercially 
available, such as medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient in a mass-produced 
product.” Id. at 361. Compounding also can be used to provide drugs in forms that are more 
palatable for children (e.g., as a pleasantly-flavored syrup rather than a medicinal-tasting 
tablet). See id. at 377. 
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compounding for bulk sales, rather than by distinguishing between 
advertised and unadvertised compounding.
36
 
The distinction between regulating speech and regulating conduct 
generally makes sense under First Amendment doctrine, but in the 
case of off-label drug prescribing, regulations of conduct raise serious 
federalism concerns. For the FDA to regulate off-label use directly, it 
would have to police the day-to-day interactions between patient and 
physician. It would have to substitute its judgment about the 
propriety of a prescription in place of the physician’s medical 
judgment. It is one thing for the FDA to decide whether a drug is 
sufficiently safe and effective to allow its sale by pharmaceutical 
companies. It is quite another matter for the FDA to decide whether a 
drug should be prescribed by physicians to particular patients. 
Historically, governmental regulation of individual prescription 
decisions has been through state rather than federal action. The fifty 
states have regulated prescription decisions through their rules for 
professional liability and professional discipline. If there is reason to 
believe a physician is inappropriately prescribing a drug, then the 
licensing board can act, and patients can sue for malpractice. In short, 
the argument against regulation of off-label marketing is an argument 
in favor of the FDA setting its own standards for an important aspect 
of the practice of medicine, and that would entail a major substitution 
of federal authority for a government authority that traditionally is 
exercised by states.
37
 
While it is common to view federalism principles as protecting 
state government authority from encroachment by the federal 
government, the federalism doctrine ultimately serves as a safeguard 
for individual liberty. As the Supreme Court has observed, “[s]tate 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.’”38 The state government is generally more accountable than 
 
 36. Id. at 371–72. 
 37. A similar federalism-based argument could have been made in Western States. By 
regulating advertising of compounding rather than compounding itself, the federal government 
deferred to state regulation of pharmacy practices. 
 38. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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is the federal government to a state’s citizens;39 moreover, state 
regulation allows for variation in approaches, and Americans can 
settle in states whose regulatory regimes are most appealing to 
them.
40
 Hence, when the Caronia and Amarin courts invoked First 
Amendment principles to protect individual liberty, they were 
sacrificing one liberty-protecting constitutional principle—the 
principle of federalism—for another liberty-protecting constitutional 
principle—the freedom to speak. As a result, the courts did nothing to 
advance the interest in liberty and contain governmental power. 
To put it another way, critics of FDA off-label marketing 
regulations want the FDA to distinguish between appropriate and 
inappropriate uses of a drug rather than between the use of a drug and 
the marketing of a drug. Focusing on whether an off-label use is 
appropriate avoids potential First Amendment problems, but it 
creates federalism problems. The FDA’s approach to off-label use of 
prescription drugs allows it to draw a line between regulating a 
matter of national concern—interstate commerce in prescription 
drugs—and not regulating a matter of local concern—the practice of 
medicine. The desire by the federal government to respect principles 
of federalism should count as sufficient reason for regulating 
promotional speech.
41
 
I do not mean to suggest that regulation of off-label prescribing 
would exceed the federal government’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce. Though prescribing regulations would be unconstitutional 
under Justice Clarence Thomas’ view of the Commerce Clause,42 
such regulation would fit within the Supreme Court’s current limits 
for the commerce power. Nevertheless, as the Court observed in 
Lopez, federal government intrusion into matters of local concern, 
such as K–12 education and family law, raise serious constitutional 
concerns.
43
 The same concerns are raised by intrusion into the 
 
 39. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012). 
 40. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161–62 (7th ed. 2013). 
 41. Under the Central Hudson standard for commercial speech, the desire to preserve 
principles of federalism would count as a substantial interest under the second prong of the 
standard.  
 42. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–92 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). Because of concerns about federal intrusion into state 
authority with exercises of the commerce power, most federal regulation of medical practice 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  Off-Label Drug Marketing 101 
 
 
traditional local concern of medical practice. Courts should 
encourage federal government respect for state government authority 
by giving substantial weight to decisions by the federal government 
not to exercise its powers to their fullest extent.  
Even if the FDA should not regulate off-label prescribing, what 
about other alternatives to the regulation of off-label marketing? 
Recall that under the final prong of the Central Hudson test, 
regulations of off-label marketing are not permitted if there are 
alternate regulations that would achieve the FDA’s goals with a 
smaller impact on the freedom of speech.
44
 Thus, for example, the 
Caronia court discussed the option of counter-speech by the 
government as an alternate regulation.
45
 Instead of restricting 
pharmaceutical company speech, the FDA could respond to 
promotional speech with its own speech.  
It is difficult to see how counter-speech would be sufficiently 
effective at serving the government’s interests. Pharmaceutical 
companies spend billions of dollars annually to promote their 
products to physicians. And much of that money is used to employ 
tens of thousands of sales representatives who meet with physicians 
and pitch the companies’ drugs.46 To respond effectively to off-label 
marketing with counter-speech, the FDA would have to establish its 
own army of representatives to meet with physicians on an individual 
basis, and it would have to know which physicians were receiving 
which off-label pitches from pharmaceutical salespersons. That is not 
a realistic option.
47
  
 
occurs through the spending power, as when Congress conditions participation in Medicare or 
Medicaid on adherence to practice regulations.  
 44. See supra note 26. 
 45. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 46. Prescription Project, Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing 
and Its Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 11, 2013), 
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-
pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients. 
 47. For further discussion of the inadequacies of counter-speech, see Kesselheim, supra 
note 8, at 250–51. 
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CONCLUSION 
When the government restricts the freedom to speak, there is good 
reason to worry that individual liberty is being compromised. Critics 
of off-label marketing restrictions are right to ask whether First 
Amendment rights are being violated. 
Upon careful examination, however, First Amendment concerns 
should not block regulation of off-label marketing. A company’s off-
label promotional speech provides probative evidence of illicit 
conduct—the distribution of misbranded drugs—and therefore 
restrictions of off-label promotion should not trigger First 
Amendment protection. In addition, the First Amendment does not 
shield promotional speech that is misleading or untruthful. 
Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies should not be able to invoke 
First Amendment protections unless they provide substantiation for 
the claims they make about off-label uses of their drugs. Even if First 
Amendment rights apply, limits on the marketing of off-label uses 
should survive. The FDA relies on its regulation of off-label 
promotion as an alternate to the direct regulation of off-label 
prescribing, and this choice actually protects individual liberty by 
restraining the federal government’s intrusion into the regulatory 
space of the states. Courts should reject the reasoning of the Caronia 
court and preserve the authority of the FDA to regulate off-label 
marketing by drug companies. 
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